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In 2002-3, President George W. Bush wanted to go to war in Iraq in the worst way 
possible; and that is more or less exactly what he did.  Bush led the country to war based 
upon a very flimsy rationale, without strong international support and with no clear 
recognition of the extent or nature of the American commitment which would be required 
to succeed.  The result has been that the war, after eight years this month, has been far 
more difficult than expected, success has been elusive, costs have been exorbitant and 
American standing in the world has suffered substantially.  A central lesson of Bush’s 
rush to war, which is sufficiently obvious that it may not need restating is that it is much 
easier to get into conflicts like Iraq, that it is to get out. 
Although the situation is Libya in 2011 is quite different than that in Iraq in 2003, the 
way Bush went to war in Iraq still partially framed the decision and options facing the 
Obama administration in recent weeks.  The decision to establish a no fly zone over parts 
of Libya may or may not have been the right thing to do, but the process for arriving at 
this decision is different.  This time, for example, the administration secured support from 
key European allies in a collaborative way.  Although much of the heavy military lifting 
will be done by the U.S., the perception that this is truly an allied effort is extremely 
important. 
Additionally, the administration clearly established the boundaries within which it would 
confine this action from the beginning.  The pledges of no ground troops in the beginning 
of the conflict place a limit on the extent of potential U.S. and European involvement in 
Libya.  This pledge is not, of course, written in stone, but it will be hard to backtrack on 
this without building very widespread political support. 
The way the administration pursued this policy underscored that it is not just necessary to 
make the right foreign policy decisions, but also to implement these decisions in the right 
way.  There are good reasons both for and against the no fly zone, but by going about it 
in a more thoughtful way, the administration both increased the chances of the policy 
succeeding, but also of beginning to establish some different precedents in foreign 
policy.  If a legacy of the Obama administration becomes that the U.S. is again serious 
about building international coalitions and that we can effectively implement limited 
military operations, it will be a substantial contribution to U.S. foreign policy. 
There are, however, some other aspects of the decision to implement the no fly zone that 
are somewhat more complicated.  First, while the support from the Arab League clearly 
gave the U.S. and its European allies some political cover for this decision, making it 
harder for critics to describe this intervention as yet another example of western 
militarism in the Arab world, it also sets something of a strange precedent.  Stressing the 
role of the Arab League in this decision comes close to suggesting that the intervention 
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occurred because the Arab League requested it.  This sets a new and rather strange bar for 
western intervention.  The U.S. cannot be in a position where it is expected to intervene 
every time the Arab League requests it.  This is unlikely, but it is not unlikely that the 
next time the Arab League wants a U.S. intervention, the expectation will be there and a 
U.S. decision not to intervene will create rancor and charges of hypocrisy. 
Second, while the no fly zone sets a new precedent for U.S., and western intervention, 
due to the threat of widespread human rights violations.  By the time the no fly zone was 
established, the situation in Libya had evolved into something of a grey area between 
civil war and a civilian population suffering widespread human rights violations at the 
hands of a dictator.  It may be that this intervention will save thousands of lives, but it is 
also certainly possible that this intervention will ultimately be viewed as part of a broader 
Libyan conflict. 
There are good reasons to intervene in a country to prevent or stop a genocide, but it is 
not at all obvious that this was the situation in Libya.  Gaddafi’s threats towards his own 
people clearly were outrageous and frightening, but the extent to which he had the means 
to implement his nefarious promises is far from clear.  If the trip wire for intervening to 
prevent widespread crimes against humanity means every time a possibly unhinged, and 
politically weak, leader makes murderous threats, it will set a precedent that will likely 
lead to considerably more calls for U.S.  intervention in the future. 
President Obama’s foreign policy has been characterized by a great deal of prudence, 
which critics might describe as excessive caution or timidity.  Obama did not rush to 
intervene in Libya, just as the administration did not rush to call for the resignation of 
President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt a few weeks previously.  The pace and nature of the 
decision to intervene, however, is probably less important than the pace and nature of 
how this intervention will be concluded.  That represents the greater and more important 
challenge. 
